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Editorial Comment
THE JUDICIARY AND POLITICS
Those familiar with our federal Constitution know
that its framers intended that the three departments of
government provided for therein-legislative, executive,
and judicial-should ever remain separate and distinct in
their respective functions. They know, too, that each was
to be a check on the other, and that no one department was
to be supreme. The fathers of our constitutional systemmen of the caliber of Jefferson, Hamilton, Madison, Wilson
and Randolph-were profound students of the science of
government, men who had assiduously studied the governments of all of the nations of the civilized world. In framing
our Constitution these men sought-and with what measure
of success is attested by our phenomenal rise under the government they founded to a position of importance second
to none among the nations of the world-to establish a government which would be free from that evil which their observations had taught them was the principal source of weakness in the governments of the other nations of the worlddespotism. This they sought to do by establishing a constition purporting to limit government, state and federal
alike, to the exercise of functions which would never interfere with the unalienable personal rights of man. Their
theory was that government is created to subserve the interests of man, not man to subserve the interests of government. The Constitution which sprang from the prolific
minds of these immortals has withstood the test of time and,
by the large, remains today what they intended should ever
remain-a citadel of liberty. Our government is unique
among those of nations of the world in that it secures to the
individual certain rights and liberties of which the government may not deprive him.
Our Constitution gave to the judicial department of
government the power of interpreting the laws passed by
the legislative department. It imposed on that judicial department the duty to declare void (and here we might cite
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the familiar case of Marbury v. Madison, 2 Law Ed. 60)
any legislative enactment inconsistent with the Constitution
-the supreme law of the land. In order that the judges
whose duty it would be to see that the legislative branch
did not exceed its constitutional grant of powers, should
be free from the influence of popular demand and from the
fear of public disfavor, so that they might determine fairly
and impartially whether or not a given legislative enactment
encroached upon the unalienable rights of the individual
secured from impairment by the Constitution, the Constitution provides that the judges in the federal courts shall
hold office by appointment, their tenure being for life or
during good behaviour. The framers of our Constitution
realized that an all-powerful legislature would be prone to
become as despotic, or more so, than would a monarch.
Madison wrote in "The Federalist" that the legislative department "is inspired by a supposed influence over the
people with an intrepid confidence in its own strength," and
that it has an "enterprising ambition" to extend its own
power, against which "the people ought to indulge all their
jealousy and exhaust all their precaution."
The Constitution, however, failed to provide that
judges of the state courts should hold office by appointment.
This, in the writer's opinion, was a mistake for the reason
that state courts, as well as federal courts, have jurisdiction
to determine whether or not an enactment of a state legislature interferes with the unalienable rights of the individual
preserved from impairment by the federal Constitution.
Since these judges in the courts of the several states are
human, and since their continuance in office depends upon
their keeping in the good graces of the voting public, their
natural propensity is to compromise what they know to be
their duty to render their decisions in conformity with the
spirit of the Constitution, and not to pervert the natural
meaning of the plain language of the Constitution and construe it in that light which will gain the greatest possible
public favor. This tendency, as well as resulting in a departure from the basic theory of our government, causes
an unnecessary crowding of the dockets of our federal
courts, since nearly all cases involving federal constitutional
questions which are decided against the litigant who claims
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he has been deprived of a constitutional'right, are appealed
to the federal courts. The writer believes that judges of
state courts should be chosen by the Bar, the members thereof alone being qualified to choose a candidate upon his
merits.
While the judges in our federal courts, as before
pointed out, are not dependent upon public favor for continuance in office, yet they too, especially within the last
twenty-five years, seem to vacillate in their decisions with
changes in the political winds. The Supreme Court of the
United States-our court of last resort in all federal questions-seems to have lost that courage and independence
which characterized it in its early day. Since the case of
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, handed by the Supreme
Court of the United States in 1897, where that august body
in passing upon the constitutionality under the state police
power of a state statute forbidding the sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors within the state of Kansas, refused to define what the word "liberty" meant as used in
the Fourteenth Amendment, saying that whether the "liberty" of the individual was infringed depended upon the
facts of each individual case, they have, it occurs to the
writer, fallen into the error when passing upon similar cases
involving the police power and "liberty" (and surely political expediency must have been. the motivating cause for
that decision) of sitting as a sort of superior legislature,
passing upon facts rather than law. In many decisions of
the Supreme Court based upon the precedent of the -Mugler
case, one finds statements to the effect that the legislature
is the best judge as to what restrictions on the personal
rights of the individual are or are not necessary in the exercise of the states' police power.
Surely the immortal fathers of our Constitution never
intended that our courts should thus interpret our laws, as
constitutional or unconstitutional, with changes in public
Whim. No, the judicial department was to. act as a check
upon the legislative department-to keep it within its constitutional bounds-for, as the immortal Jefferson once said,
"An elective despotism is not the government we fought
for."
-F. T. R.

